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Law

The Rule of Law and Access to Justice in Prisons
Good afternoon.
It is an honour and a pleasure to be speaking to you this
afternoon. And after a truly wonderful weekend I hope it will be
the first of many visits. My particular thanks to Prof Bacik for
the invitation to be here.
My topic is the rule of law and access to justice in prisons. At
the heart of my talk is the concept of accountability, along with
the importance of fairness and transparency in decisions taken in
places which are very far from public view. The rule of law is
ever more important in situations where the power relationship
is tipped in the favour of the State, as in prisons. Speaking
pragmatically, the fairness and legitimacy of decision-making in
prisons is an important element in maintaining order and decent
relationships between staff and prisoners, so essential in
ensuring security. This practical reason for the application of the
rule of law in prisons has been recognised by reports into
disturbances in prison, such as the Woolf Report in to the
Strangeways riots.
I would like to examine four main ways in which access to
justice in our prisons is deficient, some of the decisions on the
topic, and to make some proposals for improving the situation.

The topic of accountability and the rule of law in prisons is
especially timely in light of the publication of the report into the
death of Gary Douch this week.
The Rule of Law and Access to Justice in Irish and
Convention law
The decision to send a person to prison is only the beginning of
many more decisions which can have a profound effect not only
on the daily life of a prisoner, but also on their prospects upon
release, which affects all of us. The decision whether to grant a
parent temporary release to attend a major event in the life of his
or her child, the decision to allow a prisoner to attend a
relative’s funeral, to permit a prisoner to transfer to an open
prison, the decision to remove a prisoner from a particular
course of rehabilitative treatment, to place a prisoner on
protection, or to remove him or her from the rest of prison
population, are all highly consequential.
The question of the extent to which procedural fairness or the
rules of natural and constitutional justice apply in these
situations has been given relatively limited attention by the Irish
courts. There is a fundamental point here about access to justice
in that our prison law and prisoners’ rights jurisprudence has
been rather underdeveloped, much less developed than that of
the United Kingdom. There are many reasons for this, including

the absence of legal aid, the high proportion of short sentences
within our system, a lack of understanding of the possibilities of
prison law amongst practitioners, and I include myself In that,
and, though this has not been formally studied here, [it has
elsewhere] possible concern about negative consequences for
prisoners taking cases. It is unfortunate that our courts have not
had more opportunity to lay down principles concerning the rule
of law in prison. I think we are where the ECTHR was in the
90s in terms of the matters with which we have grappled,
though there are many islands of hope.
I would like to address four specific areas which require a brave
and full-bodied application of the principles of the rule of law in
the prison context. These are: decisions on temporary release,
decisions to restrict physical contact and visits generally and the
regulation of complaints made by prisoners. I had not intended
to discuss the investigation of deaths in custody, but in light of
recent events, I feel compelled to address it.
Decisions on temporary release
Temporary release is a mechanism whereby a prisoner can be
released from prison before the expiration of his or her sentence.
It can effectively end a sentence, where the release is renewed,
and the conditions of temporary release are abided by. However,
it is also used for short periods of time, perhaps a couple of

hours or a day or a few days. It was introduced in 1960 by the
Criminal Justice Act of that year and is very much associated
with the then Parliamentary Secretary or Junior Minister,
Charles Haughey, in his first ministerial role. It was a
progressive piece of legislation introduced to assist prisoners in
their reintegration and preparation for release and also as a
humanitarian measure to allow a prisoner to go home in times of
crisis or particular importance.
The legislation was amended in 2003 by another Minister with a
zeal for reform, Michael McDowell. The Criminal Justice
(Temporary Release of Prisoners) Act 2003 lays down various
factors which must be taken into account when making a
decision whether or not to grant a prisoner temporary release.
These include the nature and gravity of the offence, the period
of sentence, the potential threat to the safety and security of the
public, including the victim of the original crime, the risk of
failing to return and so on. This power is delegated to the Irish
Prison Service.
When a prisoner applies for temporary release, the decisionmaking process can be opaque. Though no formal studies have
been conducted, prisoners and practitioners report receiving
little information as to why a particular decision to refuse TR
has been arrived at. A key difficulty is that, without reasons, a

prisoner is in the position of being largely unable to challenge
the information or know the source of it.
The extent to which the family rights of a prisoner are
considered in a decision to grant temporary release is also
somewhat unclear. In this respect, if family rights or children’s
interests are at issue in a decision to refuse temporary release, it
would be prudent for the decision maker to record that these
interests were taken into account and how they were outweighed
by other interests. It is not clear that this is done routinely at
present.
The European Court of Human Rights decision in Ploski v.
Poland is relevant here. There, the applicant sought leave to
attend the funerals of his mother and father. This was refused.
The European Court of Human Rights found that the refusal
amounted to a breach of Article 8. Though there was not an
unconditional right to attend a funeral of a relative, refusal
should be the response only if there were compelling reasons
and there were no alternative solutions like escorted leave.
It is firmly established in both Irish and Convention decisions
that temporary release is a privilege and not a right. If temporary
release is being revoked, a basic duty to give reasons clearly
applies. If it is merely refused, much less is required under the
current Irish position. The caselaw is by no means clear cut, but

the Irish courts have yet to establish that there is even a limited
right to make representations or see the information upon which
the refusal was based (which would be subject of course, to
security concerns). However, the much celebrated Supreme
Court decision in Mallak concerning the duty to give reasons in
a different context may well yet give rise to a decision that, even
where the privilege of temporary release is in issue, a duty to
give reasons applies. In a perhaps unexpected decision, Article
6 of the Convention has been found not to be engaged in
decisions on temporary release following Boulois v.
Luxembourg.
The concern here is that decisions on temporary release can
impinge upon fundamental matters such as the rights of
children, and indeed rehabilitation. As such, the rule of law
requires, I argue, that basic fair procedure rights should apply.
On the question of rehabilitation, the European Court of Human
Rights is moving very close to establishing that there is a right
to the opportunity for rehabilitation in its decisions in Vinter v
UK concerning the reviewability of whole life orders or
sentences. I would like to draw attention to one passage from the
concurring opinion of Judge Ann Power-Forde in that case.

Judge Power-Forde considered that Article 3, the right to be free
from torture and/or inhuman and degrading treatment,
encompassed a ‘right to hope’. Judge Power-Forde went on:
Those who commit the most abhorrent and egregious of
acts and who inflict untold suffering upon others,
nevertheless retain their fundamental humanity and carry
within themselves the capacity to change. Long and
deserved though their prison sentences may be, they retain
the right to hope that, someday, they may have atoned for
the wrongs which they have committed. They ought not to
be deprived entirely of such hope. To deny them the
experience of hope would be to deny a fundamental aspect
of their humanity and, to do that, would be degrading.
This is a remarkable statement and an indication of the direction
in which the European Court of Human Rights is going
concerning rehabilitation. The possible implication is that
refusal to provide rehabilitative programmes may also give rise
to fair procedure rights.
Restrictions on visits
Another area which involves the rights of those affected by
imprisonment, not just prisoners themselves, and which can
have a profound effect on the process of reintegration is the

denial of contact between a prisoner and his or her visitors,
particularly children.
The default position in the Irish Prison Rules is that visits should
be what is known as ‘screened’, i.e. with a transparent partition
between visitor and prisoner. That is the default position in law,
though the position in practice is that in many institutions visits
are not screened, unless there is some reason to do so.
A prisoner who is placed on a screened visit faces a huge hurdle
in challenging that decision as a result of the High Court
judgment in Foy v. Governor of Cloverhill Prison. There the
High Court held that the default position of screening then in
place in Cloverhill was reasonable, and was most deferential to
the views of the prison governor. The decision is in considerable
contrast to the position under the Convention which requires a
specific security risk to be necessary to justify such a restriction
on contact.
Much has been happening within the Irish Prison Service which
is progressive and sensible in the last couple of years, and credit
must be given to its new Director General. In April of this year
the Irish Prison Service announced that unscreened visits would
be piloted in areas where visits had previously been screened, in
an example of practice moving ahead of the law and the
Constitution.

However, an area where access to basic fair procedures is sorely
lacking concerns the denial of visits. The Irish Prison Service
must, of course, act to ensure that contraband does not enter our
prisons to the greatest extent possible, and this concern often
drives the imposition of bans and restrictions on visits.
However, the practice of imposing open-ended bands on a
visitor, without the provision for review by the Irish Prison
Service, is a major concern. The Prison Rules give a Governor
very wide discretion to refuse a person access to a prison.
However, there is no provision in legislation concerning review
or the length of bans imposed. The European Court of Human
Rights has emphasised the need for careful reviews of bans, and
clarity concerning when bans can be imposed, especially where
children are affected (if a parent or guardian of a child is the
person banned). Again, when reasons are not forthcoming or are
inadequate, or no provision for review is inbuilt, the rule of law
is undermined.
Legal aid
A prisoner who is faced with a rejection of an application for
temporary release, or a visitor who is banned from visiting his
or her loved one has limited recourse in terms of appeal
mechanisms. The general remit of the Ombudsman in Ireland
does not apply to prisons. When the office of the Ombudsman

was introduced prisons were specifically excluded on the basis
of fear that ‘subversive prisoners’ would swamp and paralyse
the system.
In effect, a prisoner seeking to challenge these kinds of
decisions is often obliged to go down the arduous road of
judicial review. This is expensive for the State. On the other side
there are significant risks for the individual who, without legal
aid require the goodwill, or appetite for risk, of lawyers. Often
enormous work is involved.
I look at the debates in England and Wales concerning changes
to the provision of legal aid for cases taken by prisoners with
both concern and, bizarrely, envy, for what they are being
reduced to, practitioners here would be delighted with. It’s easy
to be cynical about legal aid for lawyers, but it must again be a
fundamental principle that if your rights are at stake, even or
perhaps especially, if you are in the custody of the state, then
your right of access to the courts and to justice must be
effective. On this point, I think it is at least arguable that Article
6 of the Convention is at issue when prisoners do not have
access to a scheme of legal aid to challenge decisions to, for
example, restrict their access to visits, or to rehabilitative
schemes. Decisions in England and Wales give some support to
this.

It seems that, however, the UK government is moving to restrict
legal aid further for judicial review and other areas, which has
been censured by NGOS, but also the Joint Committee of the
Houses of Parliament on Human Rights.
Attending court
Briefly, I must also mention the case of Brady v Haughton
where the Supreme Court held that a person in prison is entitled
to be present at the hearing of his action. While I understand the
resource implications of bringing prisoners to the High Court, it
seems an unnecessary infringement on the right of access to
justice to have sought to argue that this was not permitted. In my
experience, there is not a great deal of awareness of this
decision.
Complaints mechanisms
A key aspect of the rule of law in prison is access to a
complaints mechanism.
There is a mechanism provided for in the Prison Rules whereby
a prisoner can make a complaint about the conditions of his or
her detention. A complaint should be investigated by a senior
prison officer and the Governor will make a decision, which can
be appealed to the Minister.

The Inspector of Prisons has criticised the complaints
mechanisms in prison, noting that the prisoner is often not given
the opportunity to present his or her case orally, or to rebut the
evidence of others. The Inspector of Prisons cannot adjudicate
himself on complaints. The Inspector has also noted a lack of
confidence in the complaints mechanisms. Indeed the
Committee for the Prevention of Torture, a Council of Europe
body, noted a lack of confidence in Visiting Committees during
its visit in 2010.
Regarding effective complaints mechanisms, The boring tasks
of recording, of taking meticulous notes of complaints,
incidents, and responses are crucial. Justice can be served most
effectively sometimes through the mundane.
Progress, has, however again been made in the case of the most
serious kinds of complaint – those of allegations of actions
which may constitute a criminal offence, assaults, the use of
excessive force or ill-treatment, racial abuse, intimidation. Since
last year, an investigator external to the prison is appointed to
examine the complaint, and the Inspector has general oversight
of the investigations.
Concerns have also been raised about the investigation of
incidents of assault or abuse by other prisoners, particularly the

lack of investigation of allegations by the police. An inadequate
mechanism for investigating complaints made in settings so far
from the public gaze imperils the rule of law and requires
speedy reform.
Deaths in prisons
Finally, the way in which deaths of prisoners are investigated
raises critical issues of accountability and access to justice on
behalf of the deceased person and his or her family. The
circumstances of the death of Gary Douch in Mountjoy Prison
in 2006, involving severe overcrowding, failures in respect of
mental health care, and systems for transferring information
which were not fit for purpose, are shocking and tragic. As well
as this, however, Mr Douch's death raises the equally important
issue of how deaths of those in the custody of the state are
investigated. This is a well established principle under Article 2
of the Convention concerning the right to life. The Irish courts
have held that our Constitution contains an even higher level of
protection for the right to life than the Convention. The report
published by the Commission of Investigation led by Grainne
McMorrow Senior counsel is comprehensive and contains key
recommendations. However, the model of a Commission of
Investigation is unwieldy in the prison context, requiring a fresh
assessment of prison issues each time one is established. The
extension of the powers of the Inspector of Prisons to

investigate deaths of prisoners both in prison and on temporary
release is very welcome. However, it is essential that the
Inspector be given the powers of compellability and discovery,
as the CoI had.
As we have seen in the case of Gary Douch, delays in
investigations into deaths imperil access to justice and the
opportunity to learn lessons from previous failings. It was an
important symbol that the Minister for Justice apologised to the
family, which sets a different tone in penal policy, but we also
need further reform to our law governing inquests, including a
statutory scheme for legal aid for families at inquests into deaths
of prisoners, and we need a statutory basis for narrative verdicts,
whereby inquests can make findings concerning any systemic
factors contributing to a death.
Conclusion
Adherence to the rule of law and enhancing access to justice in
prisons requires the imposition of basic rights of procedural
fairness in decision-making. It also needs the establishment of
an Ombudsman for prisoners, and a mechanism for investigating
the deaths of prisoners which involves families effectively and
has strong powers.

To conclude on what is at stake and to end on what I hope is an
uplifting note, I will refer to the words of our own High Court
judge, Judge Hogan in the case of Connolly v. Governor of
Wheatfield Prison:
For even though prisoners may have strayed from the path
of righteousness and even though – [as with the case of
Mr. Connolly]– they may have severely and wantonly
injured other persons, the protection of the dignity of all is
still ... vital ... This is because the Constitution
commits the State to the protection of these standards
since it presupposes the existence of a civilised and
humane society, committed to democracy and the rule of
law and the safeguarding of fundamental rights. ...
All of us are, of course, sadly aware of the great failures of
the past and the present where these rights seemed and
seem like hollow platitudes. But this is not quite the point,
since it is by upholding these values and rights that we can
all aspire to the better realisation of the promise which
these noble provisions of the Constitution hold out for us
as a society.

Thank you.

